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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
voted to indict, a prosecutor may resubmit charges or present new
evidence to the same grand jury or a different one, so long as this
action does not impair the integrity of the grand jury proceedings
or prejudice the defendant.
Craig A. Damast
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 3406(a): Court of Appeals finds dismissal is improper sanc-
tion for failure to file a timely notice of medical malpractice
The massive number of medical malpractice claims has cre-
ated a crisis for both physicians and patients, prompting much leg-
islative attention over the past fifteen years.1 To discourage merit-
less claims, the New York State Legislature has implemented
significant substantive and procedural changes in the law,2 most
recently, the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act
("Reform Act") in 1985.1 A critical feature of the Reform Act was
the prosecutor to one resubmission of previously dismissed charges to a grand jury. See CPL
§ 190.75(3) (McKinney 1982); supra note 5 and accompanying text.
I See Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New York State Legisla-
ture Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Comprehensive
Reform, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 135, 137-44 (1986). The crisis has been characterized by a
threatened decline in the availability of health care services provided by insured physicians
due to exorbitant malpractice insurance rates. See id. at 137. A major contributing factor to
the crisis has been the rapid increase in the number of malpractice claims filed. See Brink-
ley, AMA Study Finds Big Rise in Claims for Malpractice, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1985, at
Al, col. 4. The large number of substantial settlements and inflated damage awards also has
contributed to the malpractice crisis. See Sullivan, Reducing Doctors' Costs, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 12, 1985, at B4, col. 5.
2 See Note, supra note 1, at 139. The New York Legislature first responded to the
medical malpractice crisis in 1974 by enacting section 148-a of the Judiciary Law. See N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1986). The Judiciary Law was amended to re-
quire the use of medical malpractice panels to encourage settlements and discourage merit-
less claims. See Judiciary Law, ch. 146, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws 182 (McKinney). But see
Note, supra note 1, at 161-62 (criticizing medical malpractice panels as costly failures). Ad-
ditional legislative reforms include reducing the statute of limitations period for medical
malpractice claims, CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1984), and modifying the informed consent
doctrine, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1985).
3 Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ch. 294, [1985] N.Y. Laws 685 (McKinney). The
Reform Act, which became effective July 1, 1985, was directed initially to medical and den-
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the addition of CPLR 3406, 4 specifically subdivision (a), which re-
quires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to file a
mandatory notice of malpractice within sixty days of joinder of is-
sue.5 Lower courts in New York had been divided on the issue of
tal malpractice, but was amended in 1986 by the addition of podiatric malpractice. See
Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ch. 485, § 6, [1986] N.Y. Laws 999 (McKinney).
The legislative purpose of the Reform Act was to affirmatively deal with the medical
malpractice crisis in New York by providing "comprehensive reform... [for the] malprac-
tice adjudication system ... in order to ensure the continued availability and affordability
of quality health services in New York state." Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ch. 294, § 1,
[1985] N.Y. Laws 685 (McKinney). The Reform Act sought to "reduce the cost of malprac-
tice insurance and to restrain associated health care costs, while assuring the availability of
compensation for persons injured as a result of malpractice." Id. at 685-86. This objective
would be accomplished by "expediting case resolution, discouraging frivolous claims and
defenses.., to reduce the escalating cost of malpractice insurance and to improve the adju-
dication of malpractice claims." Id. at 686.
The Reform Act provided a comprehensive overhaul of much of New York's Public
Health Law. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2803-e(1)(a), 2805-j, 2805-k (McKinney Supp.
1986); CPLR 3101(d), 3406, 4111-d, 4213-b, 4545-a, 5031-39, 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1986);
N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 6509(5)(d), 6509(11), 6524(10) (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.Y. INS. LAW §§
2343, 3437, 5502-e(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 148-a(1), 474-a(2-4) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1986).
4 See Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ch. 294, § 5, [1985] N.Y. Laws 689-90 (McKin-
ney); CPLR 3406 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
" See CPLR 3406(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990). Section 3406(a) provides, in pertinent
part:
Mandatory filing. Not more than sixty days after issue is joined, the plaintiff in an
action to recover damages for dental, medical, or podiatric malpractice shall file
with the clerk of the court in which the action is commenced a notice of dental,
medical or podiatric malpractice action, on a form to be specified by the chief
administrator of the courts.
Id. The plaintiff must file with the clerk a notice of the malpractice action along with proof
of service, proof of authorizations to obtain medical records, if demanded, and any other
papers required by the chief administrator of the courts. Id.; see also 4 WK&M § 3406.01, at
34-110 (1989).
Subdivision (a) further provides that the time for fling a notice of malpractice action
"may be extended by the court only upon a motion made pursuant to [CPLR 2004]."
CPLR 3406(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990). Stipulation of the parties for extending the time
period is excluded; hence, court approval is required for all extensions of time. See id., com-
mentary at 80; CPLR 2004 (McKinney 1962). CPLR 2004 provides:
Except where otherwise expressly prescribed by law, the court may extend the
time fixed by any statute, rule or order for doing any act, upon such terms as may
be just and upon good cause shown, whether the application for extension is made
before or after the expiration of the time fixed.
Id.; see also 2A WK&M § 2004.02-.05, at 20-27-20-33 (1989). The purpose of section 3406(a)
is to 'earmark' medical malpractice litigation for the special treatment, pre-calendar confer-
ences, and special calendar control rules required by subdivision (b). See 4 WK&M
§ 3406.01, at 34-110. CPLR 3406(b) provides that the chief administrator of the courts
"shall adopt special calendar control rules for actions to recover damages for dental, podia-
tric or medical malpractice." CPLR 3406(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990). These special rules are
codified in the Uniform Rules of New York State Trial Courts. See [1986] 22 N.Y.C.R.R.
1990]
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whether a failure to file a timely notice of malpractice may result
in dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint.6 Recently, in Tewari v.
Tsoutsouras,7 the New York Court of Appeals resolved this con-
flict, holding that the dismissal of a complaint is an improper sanc-
tion for failure to file a mandatory notice of malpractice timely."
In Tewari, the plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action
alleging that the defendant physician's negligent treatment caused
the death of her infant daughter." Three months after the action
was initiated, the defendant served his answer along with demands
for a bill of particulars and disclosure.10 The defendant sent the
plaintiff's counsel four letters over the next four months demand-
ing compliance with the discovery demands. Plaintiff's counsel
§ 202.56. The mandatory pre-calendar conference and the rules promulgated by the Chief
Administrator attempt to aid disclosure, narrow issues, explore settlement, and dispose of
meritless claims at an early stage. See id. § 202.56(b)(1). These rules provide a non-exclusive
list of measures a judge may take in preliminary conference to expedite final disposition of
the case. Id. Discovery is to be completed within 12 months after the notice of pendency. Id.
§ 202.56(b)(1)(ii); CPLR 3406(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
To the extent practicable, the parties are required to be ready for trial within 18
months of filing of the notice. [1986] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(b)(1)(vi) (McKinney); CPLR
3406(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990). The rules adopted by the Chief Administrator also provide
sanctions for failure to comply with the pre-calendar conference rules or any court direc-
tives. See [1986] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(b)(1)(vi). The sanctions prescribed include "costs,
imposition of appropriate attorney's fees, dismissal of an action, claim, cross-claim, counter-
claim or defense, or rendering a judgment by default." Id. § 202.56(b)(2).
I See, e.g., Kirschbaum v. Brookdale Hosp. and Medical Center, 147 App. Div. 2d 530,
531-32, 537 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (2d Dep't 1989) (failure to file mandatory malpractice notice
results in dismissal in absence of good cause for extension); Bonelli v. New York Hosp., 144
Misc. 2d 22, 26, 543 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989) (court granted 15-day
extension to file malpractice notice where plaintiff's excuse deemed reasonable and non-
prejudicial); Marte v. Montefiore Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 745, 748, 538 N.Y.S.2d 396,
399 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989) (dismissal not authorized sanction for failure to file
3406(a) notice); Trophia v. Valvo, 136 Misc. 2d 925, 926, 519 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1987) (failure to file mandatory notice not deemed jurisdictional), afl'd, 143
App. Div. 2d 549, 533 N.Y.S.2d 168 (4th Dep't 1988).
75 N.Y.2d 1, 549 N.E.2d 1143, 550 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1989).
* Id. at 7-10, 549 N.E.2d at 1145-47, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 574-76.
* Id. at 5, 549 N.E.2d at 1144, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The plaintiff, Phyllis Tewari,
brought the action individually and as administratrix of the estate of Jennifer, her deceased
daughter, to recover damages for Jennifer's death and conscious pain and suffering caused
by the defendant's alleged medical malpractice. See Tewari v. Tsourtouras, 140 App. Div. 2d
104, 105, 532 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (2d Dep't 1988), reo'd, 75 N.Y.2d 1, 549 N.E.2d 1143, 550
N.Y.S.2d 572 (1989). Jennifer died on March 26, 1984, and the action was brought on March
4, 1986. See id.
"0 See Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 5, 549 N.E.2d at 1144, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 573. Some of the
discovery demands sought were authorizations to obtain the medical records of all treating
physicians, hospital records and charts from four hospitals, production of x-rays, and identi-
fication of all expert and lay witnesses. Id.
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failed to answer the letters or respond to the demanded
discovery.11
The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint
based on the plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice and failure to
move for an extension of time to file.12 The plaintiff cross-moved,
pursuant to CPLR 2004, for leave to file a late notice.13 The Su-
preme Court, Queens County, denied the defendant's motion and
granted the plaintiff's cross-motion. 14 The Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department, analogizing the failure to file the mandatory no-
tice of malpractice to a pleading default, reversed and dismissed
the complaint.'"
1 Id. at 6, 549 N.E.2d at 1144, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The court noted that "[n]one of
the letters demanded that plaintiff file a notice of medical malpractice action as required by
CPLR 3406(a)." Id.
12 Id. The defendant's motion to dismiss was received on March 16, 1987, six months
after the last letter demanding discovery and eight months after the time allowed for filing a
notice of malpractice action under 3406(a) had expired. Id.
13 Id. The plaintiff stated that she had not deliberately failed to file a notice in a timely
fashion, but that her attorney had been "'awaiting production of voluminous medical
records to properly answer defendants [sic] demands for a Bill of Particulars, and serve
defendant with appropriate authorizations.'" Id.
14 Id. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion based upon "'the circum-
stances herein and in the interest of justice'" and scheduled a precalendar conference pur-
suant to CPLR 3406(b). Id.
1" See Tewari v. Tsoutsouras, 140 App. Div. 2d 104, 112, 532 N.Y.S.2d 288, 293 (2d
Dep't 1988), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 1, 549 N.E.2d 1143, 550 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1989). The court rea-
soned that because the 60 day filing period of CPLR 3406(a) had expired, the plaintiff was
required to show good cause in order to succeed on her motion to extend the time to file
under CPLR 2004. Id. The court relied on a line of pleading default cases, stating that "the
concept of default is analogous in that in this case, the plaintiff's time to file the CPLR
3406(a) notice had expired by the time she cross-moved to serve a late notice." Id.; see also
A & J Concrete Corp. v. Arker, 54 N.Y.2d 870, 872, 429 N.E.2d 412, 413, 444 N.Y.S.2d 905,
906 (1981) (showing of merit not required when application for extension of time made
before expiration of prescribed period to serve complaint); Sammons v. Freer, 99 App. Div.
2d 896, 896, 472 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (3d Dep't 1984) (once time to serve complaint expires,
affidavit of merit must be submitted with request for filing extension), afl'd, 62 N.Y.2d 1018,
468 N.E.2d 700, 479 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1984); LaBuda v. Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Medical
Center, 98 App. Div. 2d 711, 711, 469 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (2d Dep't 1983) (dismissal proper
where plaintiff failed to supply bill of particulars pursuant to conditional order of preclusion
and no affidavit of merit submitted), aff'd in part, 62 N.Y.2d 1014, 468 N.E.2d 675, 479
N.Y.S.2d 493 (1984); Smith v. Lefrak Org., Inc., 96 App. Div. 2d 859, 860, 465 N.Y.S.2d 777,
777 (2d Dep't 1983) (once preclusion order took effect plaintiff required to show reasonable
excuse for untimely filing of bill of particulars and proof of meritorious claim), aff'd, 60
N.Y.2d 828, 830, 457 N.E.2d 799, 799, 469 N.Y.S.2d 693, 693 (1983). The Appellate Division
concluded that dismissal was proper because good cause was not shown for an extension
pursuant to CPLR 2004. See Tewari, 140 App. Div. 2d at 111, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 293. The
court applied the sanction of dismissal provided for in CPLR 3406(b) and section
202.56(b)(2) of the Uniform Rules for the plaintiff's noncompliance with 3406(a). Id. at 109-
1990]
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that dismis-
sal is not a proper sanction for the failure to file a timely
mandatory notice of malpractice and that the Appellate Division
erred in denying a filing extension.16 Writing for the court, Judge
Alexander noted that the sanction of dismissal may be granted
"only when it has been authorized either by the Legislature or by
court rules consistent with existing legislation."' 7 Finding no au-
thority for the dismissal sanction in either the statute or the
rules,' 8 Judge Alexander opined that to imply such authority
would contravene the legislative intent and purpose of the Reform
Act."'9 The court contrasted CPLR 3406(a) with CPLR 3406(b),
which expressly authorizes dismissal as a sanction for noncompli-
ance.20 The court reasoned that the statute provided dismissal
11, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 292-93.
"' Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 5, 549 N.E.2d at 1143-44, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73. The court
held that the Appellate Division abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for
an extension of time to file pursuant to CPLR 2004 because the plaintiff did not show the
meritorious nature of her claim or a reasonable excuse for the delay. Id. at 5, 549 N.E.2d at
1144, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 573; see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
17 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 7, 549 N.E.2d at 1145, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 574. Under the New
York State Constitution, the authority to regulate practice and procedure in the courts is
delegated primarily to the legislature. See A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d
1, 5, 503 N.E.2d 681, 683, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (1986). In the absence of authority for a
procedural rule or a sanction of dismissal, courts are not free to impose their own sanctions
on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
18 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 7, 549 N.E.2d at 1145, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 574. Judge Alexander
found no authority for a sanction of dismissal due to a failure to file a timely notice in the
rules promulgated by the Chief Administrator pursuant to 3406(a). Id. The Uniform Rules
of New York State Trial Courts provide that "[s]uch notice shall be filed after the expira-
tion of 60 days only by leave of the court on motion and for good cause shown." [1986] 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(a)(3). "The court shall impose such conditions as may be just, including
the assessment of costs." Id. Judge Alexander focused on the word "conditions" and con-
cluded that an "[olutright dismissal upon a denial of the motion to extend cannot be viewed
as such a 'condition' because it immediately terminates the action and thus is not condi-
tional." Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 9, 549 N.E.2d at 1146, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
19 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d. at 9, 549 N.E.2d at 1146, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 575. Judge Alexander
noted that to allow a sanction of dismissal for failure to file a mandatory notice would not
only produce more litigation on collateral issues by encouraging defendants to litigate every
issue of noncompliance, but would also frustrate the legislative purpose of the Reform
Act-to expedite the adjudication of malpractice cases while assuring compensation to those
injured by malpractice. Id.; see also supra note 3 (discussing purposes of Reform Act). If the
3406(a) notice was to become the subject of substantial pretrial litigation, the adjudication
of malpractice cases would not be expedited. Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 9-10, 549 N.E.2d at 1146,
550 N.Y.S.2d at 575; see also Marte v. Montefiore Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 745, 746,
538 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989) (late mandatory notice has been single
most litigated pretrial issue in medical malpractice cases).
'o Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 8, 549 N.E.2d at 1145, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 574; see [1986] 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(b)(2).
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"only as a sanction for noncompliance with the special calendar
control rules promulgated under subdivision (b)."'1 Furthermore,
Judge Alexander stated that the rules promulgated by the Chief
Administrator did not authorize a sanction of dismissal with re-
spect to subdivision (a).22 The court also pointed to the availability
of other remedies to enforce the mandatory notice requirement of
subdivision (a).2 Finally, the court concluded that the Appellate
Division had analogized erroneously noncompliance with 3406(a)'s
notice requirement to a pleading default.24
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kaye noted additional reasons
for not implying a sanction of dismissal under CPLR 3406(a), in-
cluding: the requisite strict reading of the statute;2 5 the fact that
dismissal in the statutory scheme is not lightly granted;26 and the
harsh consequences such a sanction would impose upon plaintiffs.
21 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 8, 549 N.E.2d at 1145-46, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
22 Id. at 8, 549 N.E.2d at 1146, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
23 Id. at 10, 549 N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court noted that a defendant
can obtain an order directing that the notice be filed. Id. If the plaintiff disregards such an
order, dismissal is authorized under 3406(b) and section 202.56(b)(3) of the Uniform Rules
for the New York State Trial Courts for failure to comply with the calendar control rules of
subdivision (b) or failure to comply with court directed discovery. Id. at 10-11, 549 N.E.2d
at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see [1986] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(b)(2).
Furthermore, if a plaintiff delays the litigation, but later files a notice in response to a
court order granting an extension, the court may impose monetary sanctions such as costs
and attorney's fees. Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 11, 549 N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see
[1986] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(a)(3). Finally, even though a defendant may not seek to com-
pel filing of a late notice of malpractice, he ultimately may have the action dismissed, pursu-
ant to CPLR 3216, for the plaintiff's failure to prosecute. Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 11, 549
N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
24 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 11, 549 N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court rea-
soned that the notice requirement, unlike a pleading, is only "a rule of calendar practice
which functions to trigger the pre-calendar conference required by CPLR 3406(b)." Id. at
12, 549 N.E.2d at 1148, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 557. Also, the notice, unlike a pleading, does not
impose an obligation on the defendant which may result in his default. Id.
25 Id. at 13, 549 N.E.2d at 1148, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (Kaye, J., concurring). Judge Kaye
noted that the first step in statutory interpretation must be the statute itself. Id. (Kaye J.,
concurring). Judge Kaye stated that while CPLR 3406(b) includes a sanction of dismissal,
such a sanction is conspicuously absent from the language of 3406(a). Id. (Kaye J.,
concurring).
20 Id. at 13, 549 N.E.2d at 1149, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Kaye, J., concurring). Judge Kaye
noted that the legislature has expressed its disfavor of dismissal as a sanction. Id. (Kaye, J.
concurring); see CPLR 2005 (McKinney Supp. 1990). CPLR 2005 provides that "the court
shall not, as a matter of law, be precluded from exercising its discretion in the interests of
justice to excuse delay or default resulting from law office failure." Id. Even the power to
dismiss due to pleading defaults is not readily implied. See 2A WK&M §§ 2005.01-2005.02,
at 20-38-20-47.
27 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 13, 549 N.E.2d at 1149, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Kaye, J., concur-
ring). Dismissal before any evaluation on the merits should be invoked "only under con-
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Judge Simons, writing in dissent, argued that dismissal is ap-
propriate when viewed against the legislative efforts to rid court
calendars of stale and meritless claims.28 Judge Simons contended
that, contrary to the majority's unduly "strict reading" of the stat-
ute, implying a power of dismissal is consistent with the language
of the statute.2"
By rejecting dismissal as a proper sanction for failure to file a
timely notice of medical malpractice, it is submitted that the
Tewari court has remained faithful to both its judicial function
and the general purpose of the Reform Act, thereby expediting
medical malpractice litigation. The New York State Constitution
delegates authority to regulate practice and procedure in the
courts primarily to the legislature." Accordingly, court regulations
and sanctions regarding practice and procedure must stem from
either express or implied legislative authority.3 The New York
State Legislature neither specified any sanctions for failure to com-
ply with 3406(a),32 nor provided the Chief Administrator of the
courts with authority to mandate sanctions, such as that of dismis-
sal for such noncompliance.33 Thus, it is submitted that the Tewari
straint of justifying circumstances." Id. (Kaye, J., concurring) (citing Sortino v. Fisher, 20
App. Div. 2d 25, 28, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186, 191 (1st Dep't 1963)). Judge Kaye concluded that
where the Legislature has not authorized dismissal and no court directive has been violated,
there are no justifying circumstances for the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 13-
14, 549 N.E.2d at 1149, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Kaye, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 14-15, 549 N.E.2d at 1149-50, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79 (Simons, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 15-16, 549 N.E.2d at 1150, 550 N.E.2d at 579 (Simons, J., dissenting).
10 See N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 30; A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 5-
6, 503 N.E.2d 681, 683, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (1986) (power to dismiss complaint is legisla-
tive function); see also Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 248, 250 N.E.2d 690,
695, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640 (1969) (procedural device for dismissing complaints for undue
delay is legislative creation and not product of court's inherent power).
The New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The legislature shall
have the . . .power to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in
equity ... The legislature may ... delegate ... any power possessed by the legislature to
regulate practice and procedure in the courts." N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30.
21 See A.G. Ship, 69 N.Y.2d at 5-6, 503 N.E.2d at 683, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 218. "[C]ourt
rules must be adopted in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Constitution and
statute" and such rules must be consistent with existing legislation. Id. Because the power
to dismiss is a legislative function, the dismissal of a complaint must be authorized by either
legislation or court rules consistent with existing legislation. See id.; see also N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 30 ("Nothing ... shall prevent the adoption of regulations by individual courts
consistent with the general practice and procedure as provided by statute or general rules").
"2 See CPLR 3406(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
" See id. The Chief Administrator was given the authority to adopt rules "for the im-
position of costs and other sanctions, including ... dismissal ... for failure ... to comply
with these special calendar control rules or any order of the court made thereunder." CPLR
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court properly refused to enforce the dismissal for section 3406(a)
noncompliance since nothing in the statute supports this result.
Dismissal for noncompliance would contravene both the plain
meaning and purpose of 3406(a). s4
In Tewari, the Court of Appeals also stated that late notices
should not be handled in the same manner as pleading defaults.
Mandatory notice, unlike a pleading, neither serves to alert the de-
fendant to an existing cause of action nor imposes an obligation on
the defendant that could potentially result in a default judgment.35
The Tewari court noted that the New York State Legislature views
with disfavor dismissal in the case of certain pleading defaults.36
3406(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990). Section 202.56(b)(2) of the Uniform Rules for the New
York State Trial Courts provides a sanction of dismissal only for violations of subdivision
(b) or directives of the court. See [1986] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(b)(2); Marte v. Montefiore
Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 745, 748, 538 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989).
On the other hand, the legislature did not delegate authority to the Chief Administrator to
impose the sanction of dismissal for noncompliance with subdivision (a). See CPLR 3406(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1990). The only sanction provided by the rules for noncompliance with
subdivision (a) is the imposition of conditions under section 202.56(a)(3). See [1986] 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(a)(3). However, dismissal is not a condition. See supra note 18.
34 See. supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing purposes 6f medical malpractice
reform). Dismissal as a sanction for noncompliance with CPLR 3406(a) would send a mes-
sage to defense attorneys that they may engage in dilatory tactics and "wait-out" the law-
suit because any procedural flaw on the plaintiff's part, including failure to file a timely
notice, may result in dismissal of the complaint. See Kramer, Torts, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv.
605, 607 (1989). Further, issues of notice compliance would become the subject of substan-
tial pretrial litigation. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. It has been noted that a
sanction of dismissal results in the forfeiture of the party's claim, thereby imposing a pen-
alty on the client for what is typically the attorney's fault. See Collazo v. Fiasconaro,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1989, at 25, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County). Moreover, this may lead to legal
malpractice claims which would further burden court calendars and provide an inadequate
remedy for faultless clients. Id.
"I Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 12, 549 N.E.2d at 1148, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 577. "[F]ailure to
timely file the CPLR 3406(a) notice is not analogous to a pleading default." Id. Article 34 of
the CPLR is entitled "Calendar Practice: Trial Preference," while Article 30 is entitled
"Remedies and Pleading." It appears, therefore, that a 3406(a) notice was not meant to be
classified as a pleading, but rather as a means by which expedited discovery and adjudica-
tion in malpractice cases could be ordered. See Medical Malpractice Insurance-Comprehen-
sive Reform Act, ch. 294, [1985] N.Y. Laws 685 (McKinney). The stringent showing needed
to obtain an extension of time to file a pleading by a party already in default, pursuant to
CPLR 2004, does not apply to an untimely notice filing. Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 12, 549
N.E.2d at 1148, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 577. Therefore, an extension in filing the notice under
CPLR 2004 upon "good cause shown," should not fail simply because the plaintiff did not
submit an affidavit of merits. See id.
"6 See CPLR 2005 (McKinney Supp. 1990). The Court of Appeals has declared that law
office failure, as a matter of law, is an insufficient excuse to defeat a motion to dismiss a
pleading default. See Barasch v. Micucci, 49 N.Y.2d 594, 600, 404 N.E.2d 1275, 1277-78, 427
N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (1980). The Barasch court provided that an acceptable excuse and an
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Judge Kaye concluded that the legislature does not advocate dis-
missal as a sanction for mere procedural deficiencies."7
It is submitted that it would be incongruous to assume that
the legislature would approve dismissal for noncompliance with
3406(a), while affording pleading defaults more leniency. Accord-
ingly, it is further suggested the Tewari court properly concluded
that where there has been noncompliance with section 3406(a),
other remedies, such as monetary sanctions, would better promote
the dual objectives of the Reform Act"s by discouraging dilatory
tactics of attorneys and securing compensation for plaintiffs with
legitimate malpractice claims.39
affidavit of merit were required for an extension of time to file a late pleading. Id. at 600,
404 N.E.2d at 1277, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 734. With respect to law office failure, Barasch stripped
the courts of judicial discretion in considering dismissal for procedural delay, substituting a
flexible test which takes into account the length of the delay, the nature of the excuse, and
the merits of the case with a rigid non-discretionary test. See id. at 599, 404 N.E.2d at 1277,
427 N.Y.S.2d at 734. Although the Barasch court refused to broadly construe the dismissal
sanction by limiting dismissal as a matter of law to "rare instances," the Barasch analysis
was soon applied to a defendant's untimely answer. See Eaton v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc. of the United States, 56 N.Y.2d 900, 902-03, 438 N.E.2d 1119, 1120, 453 N.Y.S.2d 404,
405 (1980) (almost any procedural default due to law office failure will result in dismissal).
Due to the harshness of dismissal, lower New York courts often struggle to avoid a finding
of "law office failure." See Comment, Law Office Failure: The Need for a Definition after
Barasch and Eaton, 47 AL B. L. REv. 826, 843-45 (1983).
The enactment of CPLR 2005 had the practical effect of overruling Barasch and Eaton.
Id.; see 2A WK&M § 2005.02, at 20-41. CPLR 2005 is a remedial statute which restored
discretion to the courts after Barasch and Eaton. See 2A WK&M § 2005.02, at 20-41; supra
note 26. With the restoration of judicial discretion regarding law office failure, lower courts
have realized that dismissal is a drastic remedy which should be used only when the failure
to comply with disclosure requirements is shown to be willful and deliberate. See, e.g., Mink
v. Park, 142 App. Div. 2d 899, 902, 531 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (3d Dep't 1988) (dismissal not
warranted where unprofessional conduct by plaintiff's attorney did not constitute willful
noncompliance); Scharlack v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 127 App. Div. 2d 580, 581, 511
N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (2d Dep't 1987) (nine-month unexcused failure to comply with court or-
der was willful and warranted dismissal).
'7 See Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 13, 549 N.E.2d at 1149, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Kaye, J.,
concurring); see also supra notes 26, 27, and 33 and accompanying text (indicating legisla-
ture's disfavor of dismissal as sanction).
38 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 10-11, 549 N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The Tewari
court's decision is consistent with the statutory preference of imposing fees and costs in-
stead of dismissal. See CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1990). CPLR 8303-a authorizes the
imposition of fees and costs up to $10,000 for frivolous malpractice claims, and was
amended in 1986 to apply to all personal injury litigation. Id. Lower courts have followed
the Court of Appeals' preference for monetary sanctions for noncompliance with CPLR
3406(a). See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Pleading defaults have sometimes re-
ceived similar treatment. See, e.g., Cockfield v. Apotheker, 81 App. Div. 2d 651, 651, 438
N.Y.S.2d 379, 379 (2d Dep't 1981) ($2,500 sanction).
11 See Medical Malpractice Insurance-Comprehensive Reform Act, ch. 294, § 1, [1985]
1990] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
The New York Court of Appeals has, in effect, directed lower
courts to implement more efficient remedies, such as monetary
sanctions, to compel compliance with CPLR 3406(a).40 In light of
this directive, attorneys would be wise to abide by the mandatory
notice requirement time restraints pursuant to CPLR 3406(a) and
avoid possible pecuniary sanctions for failure to comply in a timely
manner pursuant to CPLR 3406(a).
Michael S. Re
GENERAL BusINEss LAW
GBL § 198-a(k): Lemon Law's alternative arbitration mechanism
requiring an automobile manufacturer to submit to binding arbi-
tration at the consumer's request is'constitutional
The New York State Legislature enacted its first new car
"Lemon Law" in 1983.1 This law, General Business Law section
198-a, was promulgated in response to numerous complaints by
consumers, who were dissatisfied with the myriad of confusing reg-
ulations and ineffective commercial law remedies available to
them.2 The Lemon Law, as originally adopted, provided the pur-
N.Y. Laws 685 (McKinney); see also supra note 3 (discussing purposes of Reform Act).
40 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 10-11, 549 N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see [1986] 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(a)(3) (1986); supra note 23 and accompanying text (listing other reme-
dies as alternatives to dismissal). Futhermore, "every reported case granting permission for
a late filing has imposed the monetary sanctions provided by CPLR 2004 and the rule
202.56(a)(3)." Marte v. Montefiore Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 745, 751, 538 N.Y.S.2d 396,
400 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989); see Kirck v. Samaan, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1989, at 26, col. 4
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County) (sanction of $1,500 imposed); Collazo v. Fiasconaro, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
9, 1989, at 25, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) ($3,500 sanction imposed).
I GBL § 198-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990). If a new car fails to conform to all
express warranties during the first two years or 18,000 miles, whichever is earlier, upon
timely notice to the manufacturer, the consumer is entitled to free repairs. Id. § 198-a(b)(1).
If, after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer is unable to repair a defect that
substantially diminishes the value of the car, the manufacturer must either replace the car
or refund its purchase price. Id. § 198-a(c)(1). For an overview of the development of the
Lemon Law in New York, see Abrams, New York Lemon Law Arbitration Program: Annual
Report-1987, 43 ARB. J. 36, 36-47 (Sept. 1988); Comment, New York's Used-Car Lemon
Law: An Evaluation, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 971, 989 (1986).
2 Abrams, supra note 1, at 36-37. Before 1983, the manufacturers' approach to con-
